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FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF MILITARY
PERSONNEL: DENYING RIGHTS TO THOSE
WHO DEFEND THEM
INTRODUCTION
In Goldman v. Weinberger,1 the Supreme Court decided that prohib-
iting a rabbi from wearing a yarmulke2 while on duty as a commissioned
officer and psychologist in an Air Force hospital did not violate his first
amendment 3 right to free exercise of religion.4 The Court deferred to
the "professional judgment" s of the military that this prohibition was
necessary for the "group mission, ' ' 6 and never examined the petitioner's
first amendment claim. The Supreme Court gave Goldman the choice
either to violate daily a religious practice or to risk court-martial; 7 it did
not balance the interests of the parties, require the government to estab-
lish a connection between the wearing of yarmulkes and harm, or indi-
cate when it would enjoin the military for unconstitutional encroachment
on free exercise of religion.
Judicial deference to decisions of the military is slowly becoming
entrenched as the rule of decision in the federal courts.8 The holding in
Goldman, although surprising because of its facts, is consistent with
Supreme Court precedent, and has been reinforced by the latest Supreme
Court decisions, which virtually immunize the military from judicial re-
view. During the 1986 Term, the Supreme Court decided two cases that
will have potentially devastating effects on the constitutional protections
enjoyed by military personnel.9
1 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
2 A yarmulke is a skullcap. Religious Jews cover their heads. See Shulchan Aruch, Or-
ach Chayim 2:6, 151:6, 282:3 (code of Jewish conduct). The Jewish practice of head covering
originated in Babylonia during the Talmudic period. See 2 A. Shulman, Gateway to Judaism
603 (1971).
3 The first amendment provides, in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
of speech ... ." U.S. Const. amend. I.
4 Goldman, 475 U.S. at 506-10.
5 Id. at 507.
6 Id. at 509-10. The Court did not define this term. For a discussion of military necessity,
see notes 64-65 and accompanying text infra.
7 Goldman, 475 U.S. at 509-10.
8 See notes 92-99, 123-26 and accompanying text infra.
9 In Solorio v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2924 (1987), the Court enlarged the jurisdiction of
courts-martial in criminal rases, thus depriving many defendants of procedural protections in
the civil courts. See note 57 infra. In United States v. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. 3054 (1987), decided
on the same day as Solorio, the Court denied recovery to a soldier who had been used as an
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Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
The judiciary occupies a sensitive position when it reviews military
cases because, in this area, explicit constitutional powers have been
granted to both the executive and the legislative branches of govern-
ment, 10 and the judiciary is without a specific constitutional grant."l
Nonetheless, the judiciary is always obliged to decide "[c]ases... arising
under [the] Constitution, [and] the Laws of the United States .... ,,12
When a military regulation conflicts with a constitutionally guaran-
teed individual right, there is a clash between co-equal branches of gov-
ernment.13 The judiciary, as the final reviewer of constitutionality, 14 has
the burden of deciding how closely to scrutinize decisions made by other
branches. 1 5 Where there are not such explicit grants of authority to the
other branches, the courts are active in safeguarding the Bill of Rights.' 6
For example, the federal judiciary has played the central role in enforc-
ing equal protection for blacks in public education,1 7 in establishing a
unknowing subject in LSD experiments, and had suffered lasting harm as a result.
10 "The Congress shall have Power... To declare War... To raise and support Armies
... To provide and maintain a Navy; To make Rules for.., the land and naval Forces .... "
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-13. "The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army
and Navy of the United States ...." U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
II The Court has often invoked the constitutional scheme to explain its deference to the
other branches of government in military matters. See e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57,
66 (1981).
12 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. In addition to this constitutional mandate, the judiciary has
historically championed individual rights. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (woman
has constitutional right to abortion); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (state cannot
force Amish children to go to school against will of their parents in contravention of religious
beliefs); see notes 16-19 and accompanying text infra.
13 Although this is true every time the judiciary reviews congressional legislation, it is more
severe in military matters because the constitutional grants are explicit; power is granted to
both of the other branches and the Court has treated the clash as a barrier to rigorous review.
See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 59 (reciting constitutional powers of Congress). The American sys-
tem of separation of powers requires that each federal branch respect the decisions of the
others. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (Court will respect decision of coor-
dinate branch of government); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (Executive
must comply with order from Court).
14 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (establishing judicial
supremacy).
15 The judiciary must decide how closely to scrutinize the decisions already considered by
other branches because of its duty to decide cases and controversies. See Cohens v. Virginia,
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) ("We have no more right to decline the exercise ofjurisdic-
tion which is given, than to usurp that which is not given."); U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
16 This has been especially true when the federal courts have reviewed state legislation.
See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (state antimiscegenation law violated equal
protection); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (state law requiring production of
group's membership lists violated associational liberty); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510, 534-45 (1925) (state law requiring children to attend public schools violated free exercise
of religion).
17 See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 30 (1971) (busing
may sometimes be constitutionally mandated remedy to end de jure segregation in public
schools); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (segregated schools unconstitutional).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 62:855
RIGHTS OF MILITAR Y PERSONNEL
right to privacy, 18 and in guaranteeing freedom to speakers espousing
unpopular views.' 9
Although individuals in the military may have the same claims
against the government as have civilians, the courts exercise more re-
straint towards the military than towards other government entities, both
out of of institutional respect and also due to the courts' unfamiliarity
with the military.20 The military has been treated as a "separate commu-
nity"21 with its own laws, morality, and courts, and the federal courts
have been extremely reluctant to become involved. The "separate com-
munity" notion defines the military as having a character distinct enough
from the civilian community to be independent of it.22
This Note argues that only service personnel in combat during war
should be treated as members of a separate community. Most military
personnel should be treated as a part of the civilian community, equally
protected by the Constitution under which the rest of American society
functions.23 The few who are in the separate community should be com-
pletely outside of the jurisdiction of the federal courts, pursuant to the
political question doctrine. 24 Conversely, those service personnel not in
combat, who cannot be said to be part of a separate community, deserve
protection by the federal judiciary when their constitutional rights are
violated. For these people, the courts can balance military interests
against individual interests in the same manner that they balance other
governmental interests against individual interests. 25 In peacetime, the
18 See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (right to view pornography in
one's home); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (right to use contraceptives).
14 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (racist speech protected unless
it poses formidable clear and present danger).
20 See notes 49-58 and accompanying text infra.
21 See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 744 (1974); Bums v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140
(1953) (plurality opinion); Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953).
22 For a defense and analysis of the concept of the separate community, see Hirschhorn,
The Separate Community: Military Uniqueness and Servicemen's Constitutional Rights, 62
N.C.L. Rev. 177 (1984). But see Finn, The Two Societies, in Conscience and Command 3 (J.
Finn ed. 1971) (arguing against separate community).
23 This Note is concerned only with the first amendment rights of service personnel. All
other constitutional rights are beyond the scope of this discussion.
24 The political question doctrine relates solely to justiciability; the courts leave the deci-
sion to another branch. See Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 Yale L.J.
597, 599-600 (1976). Although some of the factors that determine whether an issue is a polit-
ical question are also important in determining the proper amount of deference due to a co-
equal branch, this Note uses the term "political question" to refer solely to justiciability. See
notes 156-58, 164-71 and accompanying text infra.
25 A balancing test is appropriate in adjudicating first amendment claims. See, e.g., Wayte
v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 611 (1985) (state must show important government interest
unrelated to suppression of speech that restricts speech no more than necessary); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (state must show interest of "highest order" that would not
otherwise be achieved to restrict free exercise of religion).
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worker who sits at a desk in the Pentagon should enjoy the same rights as
his counterpart at a desk in the Capitol.
Part I of this Note discusses the structure of the military system of
justice and its relationship to the civilian community. It describes the
constitutional scheme that defines the powers over the military and how
constitutional conflict among the branches of government arises when a
first amendment claim is raised by military personnel. Part I then out-
lines the system of justice in the military and compares that system to the
civilian system.
Part II explains the development of first amendment law for the mil-
itary in the federal courts from cases that dealt with dissent by service
personnel during the Vietnam War. These decisions were restrictive, and
later cases used their precedents aggressively, leading to today's limited
first amendment rights for military personnel.26
Part III proposes a standard for adjudication of first amendment
claims raised by military personnel in the federal courts. It argues that
the rights of military personnel are restricted by the military establish-
ment without any compelling government interest, and that no other
group of people subject to the control of the United States government is
expected to suffer such abridgment of its rights. This Part suggests that
the courts establish two separate standards for review-one for combat
troops in war (the "wartime" standard), and one for all other military
personnel (the "peacetime" standard). In combat, military efficiency, on-
the-spot command decision making, and discipline are critical, and the
consequences of judicial mistake may be catastrophic. Decisions made
about combat troops during war should therefore be regarded as political
questions according to the Supreme Court's definition of that doctrine in
Baker v. Carr,27 and the federal courts should refuse to hear cases that
arise during wartime. 28
On the other hand, the peacetime standard for adjudication of first
amendment claims of military personnel should be the well-established
standard for civilians. For civilians, once an activity is determined to be
protected by the first amendment, the government must present the court
with compelling justification to restrict that activity; the court then bal-
ances the interest of the government against the interest of the individual.
Under such a standard, the court would engage in a balancing test and
incorporate the military interests into the evaluation of whether the state
26 Although the substantive rights to free speech and free exercise of religion are different,
this Note uses case law regarding these rights interchangeably because the test that the Court
applies is the same.
27 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
28 This does not suggest that the military courts, including the United States Court of
Military Appeals, should not hear such cases.
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has raised a compelling purpose, and weigh this evaluation against the
individual rights of the serviceperson. When the federal courts have ju-
risdiction and adjudicate a dispute, they should review the substantive
issues thoroughly, and in peacetime, service personnel deserve full con-
sideration of their claims.
I
THE RELATIONSHIP OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN CONTROL
A. A Constitutional Power Struggle
Throughout American history, control over the military has been
concentrated in the hands of the Executive and Congress.29 Article I of
the Constitution grants Congress the power "To declare War... To raise
and support Armies, ...To provide and maintain a Navy; To make
Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
Forces." °30 Article II makes the President the Commander in Chief of the
Army and the Navy.31
The judiciary is absent from this scheme. The military has operated
independently, employing its own courts32 to review both exclusively
military problems and crimes committed by military personnel.33 None-
theless, since 1953, the Supreme Court and the Court of Military Ap-
peals3 4 have made it clear that the Bill of Rights's guarantees should
apply to service personnel.35
When a military law or regulation impinges upon a serviceperson's
first amendment rights, a constitutional conflict arises. If the law or reg-
29 The Court recently expressed the view that Congress's power over the armed forces is as
plenary as it is over interstate commerce. Soloro v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2924, 2928
(1987).
30 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-13.
31 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
32 Courts-martial, unlike the federal courts, are article I courts, not article III courts. Arti-
cle I courts have less power than article III courts, and decisions of article I courts are usually
reviewable by article III courts. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co., 458 U.S. 50, 79 (1982).
33 See notes 49-55 and accompanying text infra.
34 The Court of Military Appeals is the highest specialized military court and is composed
of civilian judges. See Uniform Code of Military Justice (U.C.M.J.) art. 67, 10 U.S.C. § 867
(1982 & Supp. III 1985).
35 See Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953). There are still some exceptions to this general
proposition. See J. Bishop, Justice Under Fire 133-36 (1974). For example, service personnel
are explicitly excluded from the right to a grand jury indictment. U.S. Const. amend. V. They
also do not enjoy the rights to trial by jury or bail. See J. Bishop, supra, at 114.
Commentators disagree as to whether the framers intended the protection of the Bill of
Rights to apply to service personnel. Compare Henderson, Courts-Martial and the Constitu-
tion: The Original Understanding, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 293 (1957) (arguing that Bill of Rights
was intended to protect service personnel) with Wiener, Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights:
The Original Practice, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 266 (1958) (refuting Henderson theory).
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ulation is fully enforced, then the individual's Bill of Rights guarantees
will be infringed; if the courts move to protect the individual's rights,
then the political branches' explicit and plenary constitutional power
over the military will be limited. It is a sensitive task to determine which
part of the Constitution requires fullest enforcement in a particular case.
Whereas the civilian judiciary is properly silent on most military mat-
ters, 3 6 its role as the protector of individual rights is implicated when the
military restricts first amendment expression.37
Judicial protection of rights of military personnel may therefore be
seen as a power struggle between the constitutional grants to the
branches of government. From the perspective of enforcing the Consti-
tution, it is necessary to understand how justice is dispensed in the mili-
tary, and determine whether constitutional concerns can be better
balanced by the federal courts.
B. Military Justice and Discipline
From the founding of this country, a separate criminal code gov-
erned the military.38 The understanding through the nineteenth century
was that the purpose of the military justice system was to ensure disci-
plined troops, and the court-martial was a tool that could be used at the
commander's discretion to instill fear and obedience in his soldiers.3 9
Following World War II, there was a great outcry against the military
justice system.4° The American armed forces were larger during World
War II than ever before, and there was an unprecedented number of
courts-martial. 41 Congress replaced the anachronistic Articles of War
with a Uniform Code of Military Justice (U.C.M.J.), 42 which made mili-
tary law more like civilian law.43
Even today the basic structure of authority in the military charges a
commander with applying the laws and the regulations to the service
personnel under his command.44 Many regulations give a commander
36 For example, the federal courts will not review matters of purely military concern. See
Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 90 (1953) (no review of decision whether to grant officer a
commission).
37 "[Glenerals and admirals, not federal judges, are expert about military needs. But it is
equally true that judges, not military officers, possess the competence and authority to inter-
pret and apply the First Amendment." Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 370 (1979) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
38 The colonists adopted the British Articles of War intact. Major revisions were made in
1776, 1786, 1806, 1874, 1916, and 1920. E. Byrne, Military Law 8 (3d ed. 1981).
39 Sherman, Justice in the Military, in Conscience and Command 21 (J. Finn ed. 1971).
40 See J. Jacobs, Socio-Legal Foundations of Civil-Military Relations 5 (1986).
41 Id.
42 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 801-934 (West 1983 & Supp. 1987).
43 J. Jacobs, supra note 40, at 6.
44 See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 356 (1979).
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the power to make exceptions to the rules.45 Although the grant of
power from the Department of Defense to the commanders directs them
to preserve free speech "to the maximum extent possible,"'46 congres-
sional delegation to the military is essentially plenary, and therefore there
is no real limitation.
Congressional guidelines for commanders are sometimes vague,
forcing the ad-hoc application of the laws, even when the commander is
genuinely interested in fairness of application.47 No other segment of
American society is as vulnerable to the judgments of others, or required
to comply with someone's personal will or otherwise fear criminal
sanctions.48
The military is governed by a special system of laws passed specifi-
cally for it, and its criminal-trial process is wholly independent from the
civilian judiciary. Today, the U.C.M.J. is the primary source of substan-
tive law in the military,49 and it includes provisions parallel to civilian
45 For example, the regulation under which Goldman was forbidden to wear his yarmulke
allowed the commander to make limited exceptions. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S.
503, 509 (1986) (citing Air Force Reg. 35-10 (1980)). Delegation of such substantial power to
commanders presents serious problems for judicial review. With regard to actions by the de-
partments of the military and action by commanders, the standard that courts generally use in
reviewing delegated power provides little limitation. See B. Schwartz, Administrative Law 436
(2d ed. 1982). Challenges to administrative power are based on an ultra vires theory, but if the
grant of power is very broad, then there is much discretion without violation of granted pow-
ers, and therefore no control over agency action. See id. Congress must circumscribe dele-
gated power and announce an adequate standard for an agency to ensure that important policy
decisions are made by Congress, rather than the departments or the officials within them. See
Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685-86 (1980) (Rehnquist,
J., concurring).
46 Department of Defense Directive 1325.6 par. II (Sept. 12, 1969), reprinted in Con-
science and Command 283 (J. Finn ed. 1971).
47 For example, article 133 of the U.C.M.J. makes punishable "conduct not becoming an
officer and a gentleman." U.C.M.J. art. 133, 10 U.S.C. § 933 (1982). Article 134 criminalizes
"all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline... [and] conduct of a
nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces." U.C.M.J. art. 134, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1982).
Under articles 133 and 134, various acts have been subject to court-martial. See, e.g., United
States v. Vaught, 9 M.J. 685 (1979) (sniffing intoxicants); United States v. Sanchez, I 1 C.M.A.
216, 29 C.M.R. 32 (1960) (bestial acts with a chicken); United States v. Huffman, 6 C.M.R.
244 (1952) (passing bad check). These articles were challenged for vagueness and overbreadth,
but upheld by the Supreme Court. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974); notes 66-87 and
accompanying text infra.
Speech may easily fit under these articles. See United States v. Howe, 17 C.M.A. 165, 37
C.M.R. 429 (1967) (upholding officer's court-martial conviction for carrying at rally sign that
called President a fascist).
4S See U.C.M.J. art. 92, 10 U.S.C. § 892 (1982) (anybody who fails to obey orders subject
to court-martial). While criminal sanctions in the military are applied to a much broader
range of activity than for society generally, the punishment for many offenses is very light or of
a different nature than in civilian life. See U.C.M.J. art. 15, 10 U.S.C § 815 (1982) (describing
nonjudicial punishment).
49 The Manual for Courts-Martial, produced by the Executive with the delegated authority
of Congress, is substantive only in the areas of sentence determination and definition of aggra-
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criminal law as well as unique military offenses.50 The U.C.M.J. placed
the court-martial system under the supervision of a civilian Court of Mil-
itary Appeals.5 1
The modem military court system is quite different from the usual
civilian court. There are three types of courts-martial, each designed to
handle infractions of varying severity, and each permitted to mete out
certain maximum punishments.52 A court-martial is convened in the
same way in all cases: 53 a commander decides what type of court-martial
will try an accused and sets it up. 54 This is the characteristic that most
vating circumstances. See E. Byrne, supra note 38, at 10-11, 13-14 (1981). The Department of
Defense may issue directives, and each of the services also has the authority to pass regulations
for itself. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 5043 (West Supp. 1987) (marines); id. § 3013(g)(3) (army); 10
U.S.C. § 6011 (1982) (navy); id. § 8012(f) (air force).
50 U.C.M.J. arts. 77-134, 10 U.S.C. §§ 877-934 (1982), are "punitive articles" that describe
the substantive law. They include: larceny (art. 121, 10 U.S.C. § 921), murder (art. 118, 10
U.S.C. § 918) and rape (art. 120, 10 U.S.C. § 920), as well as desertion (art. 85, 10 U.S.C.
§ 885), failure to obey orders (art. 92, 10 U.S.C. § 892) and conduct unbecoming an officer and
a gentleman (art. 133, 10 U.S.C. § 933).
Some commentators believe that the U.C.M.J. provides service personnel with virtually
all of the procedural protections that are guaranteed to accused civilians. See J. Bishop, supra
note 35, at 25-44; see also E. Byrne, supra note 38, at 87 (defending fairness of military justice
system). Other commentators, however, believe that the U.C.M.J. preserved the major flaw in
the old court-martial system-commander control over proceedings rather than an independ-
ent judiciary. See Sherman, supra note 39, at 35-52; notes 54-55 and accompanying text infra.
51 10 U.S.C. § 867 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Some commentators credit the United States
Court of Military Appeals with subordinating the military justice system to the rule of law, see
Jacobs, supra note 40, at 6-7, and others blame it for undermining military efficiency, see E.
Byrne, supra note 38, at 12.
52 A summary court-martial consists of one officer, who decides the case. U.C.M.J. art. 16,
10 U.S.C. § 816 (1982). The Supreme Court has held that representation by counsel is unnec-
essary in a summary court-martial. Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976). Special and
general courts-martial are composed of members who act as a kind of jury, although they are
not the peers of the accused. U.C.M.J. art. 25 describes who may serve on a court-martial.
See 10 U.S.C.A. § 825 (1983 & West Supp. 1987). The accused is entitled to a military lawyer
in special and general proceedings, and a lawyer also represents the government, both of whom
are detailed by the commander, and both of whom are in the unit. U.C.M.J. art. 27, 10 U.S.C.
§ 827 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Although a commander is not permitted to consider an attor-
ney's defense of an accused as a factor in evaluations for promotions, the possibility for subtle
commander control is enormous. See J. Bishop, supra note 35, at 34; see also West, Command
Influence, in Conscience and Command 102-09 (J. Finn ed. 1971) (describing blatant action
taken against enthusiastic defense counsel). In all general and some special courts-martial, a
military judge who is appointed by the Judge Advocates General is required to preside.
U.C.M.J. art. 26, 10 U.S.C. § 826 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The military judge is not
subordinate to the commander-this is the only characteristic of an independent judiciary
found in the military. Since 1968, an accused has had the right to ask for a bench trial in order
to minimize the possibility of commander influence by removing the decision-making appara-
tus from the control of the unit commander. See U.C.M.J. art. 16, 10 U.S.C. § 816 (1982 &
Supp. III 1985).
53 The parties who may convene each kind of court-martial differ, however. See U.C.M.J.,
arts. 22-24, 10 U.S.C. §§ 822-824 (1982).
54 E. Byrne, supra note 38, at 86-92.
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differentiates the military court system from the civil system. Critics of
the military justice system are most disturbed about command control of
the court-martial machinery and the unfair influence it can have on an
adjudication. 55
Within the military, there is an extensive system of appeals. The
Court of Military Review may review both the facts and the law in a
court-martial. The highest court is the United States Court of Military
Appeals, which, as a civilian court, can review only errors of law in
courts-martial. 56
Habeas corpus has been of some use to service personnel seeking
review in the civilian courts, but historically its use has been very limited.
Until the 1950s, the only basis for the issuance of a federal writ of habeas
corpus was lack of jurisdiction by the military court over either the sub-
ject matter of or a party to the dispute.57 If the federal court found that
55 See Sherman, supra note 39, at 28; West, supra note 52, at 73. The Supreme Court has
expressed clear skepticism about the quality of justice dispensed in the military courts.
"[C]ourts-martial... are singularly inept in dealing with the nice subtleties of constitutional
law.... [A] military trial is marked by the age-old manifest destiny of retributive justice."
O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 265-66 (1969) (dictum) (overruled by Solorio v. United
States, 107 S. Ct. 2924 (1987)).
56 U.C.M.J. art. 67, 10 U.S.C. § 867 (1982).
57 See, e.g., Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952); Gibson v. United States, 329 U.S. 338
(1946). The U.C.M.J. granted wide jurisdiction to the court-martial, but in the ensuing years
the Supreme Court cut back that jurisdiction so that, until last Term, military courts had
jurisdiction only over the most narrow class of cases: military personnel doing service-con-
nected acts. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969). Last Term, the Supreme Court
broadened the jurisdiction of the military courts by overruling O'Callahan and conditioning
court-martial jurisdiction on only one factor-military status. See Solorio v. United States,
107 S. Ct. 2924 (1987). Solorio did not expressly overrule the other limitations on court-martial
jurisdiction that have developed. See, e.g., Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866) (mili-
tary courts cannot try ordinary civilians); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (military courts
cannot try military dependents in capital cases); Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361
U.S. 234 (1960) (military courts cannot try military dependents in noncapital cases); Harmon
v. Bruckner, 355 U.S. 579 (1958) (military courts cannot try military personnel for acts com-
mitted prior to induction into the military, or not included in a serviceperson's military rec-
ord); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U. S. 11 (1955) (military courts cannot try
military personnel for acts committed during military service but not tried until after dis-
charge).
Whether the civilian court has jurisdiction over the case is also an issue in federal court
review of courts-martial. See Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971). The Supreme
Court has not explicitly described when the federal courts have jurisdiction over a case that
originated in the military, but it has itself reviewed such cases, implying that they are within
the jurisdiction of the federal courts. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
There are eight circuits that require claims against the military to pass a threshold test before
federal courts will entertain them. See Note, Judicial Review of Constitutional Claims Against
the Military, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 387, 397 (1984) (listing cases). The test, articulated in Mindes,
453 F.2d at 201, requires that the court balance several factors before deciding to review a
case, including: (1) the "strength of the plaintiff's challenge to the military determination"; (2)
the "potential injury to the plaintiff if review is refused"; (3) the "type and degree of antici-
pated interference with the military function"; and (4) "[t]he extent to which the exercise of
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the military courts had correctly exercised jurisdiction over both the per-
son and the subject matter, then the aggrieved person had no further
remedy from the civilian courts.58 The landmark case of Burns v. Wil-
son 59 began the federal courts' substantive habeas review for constitu-
tional violations.60
II
DEVELOPMENT IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF FIRST
AMENDMENT LAW FOR THE MILITARY
Burns v. Wilson 61 established that service personnel do have consti-
tutional rights, which, although not absolute, will be vindicated by a fed-
eral court upon review by habeas corpus.62 The Supreme Court has
subsequently stated that "[w]hile the members of the military are not
excluded from the protection granted by the first amendment, the differ-
ent character of the military community and of the military mission re-
quires a different application of those protections. '63 Nonetheless, the
Court has never explicitly defined the circumstances in which constric-
tion of first amendment rights is proper, the permissible extent of the
abridgment of constitutional rights, nor the governmental interest neces-
sary to override the interest of the individual.
The government generally proffers "military necessity" to support
the constriction of first amendment rights of military personnel, 64 and
military expertise or discretion is involved." Id.
58 J. Bishop, supra note 35, at 120-21.
59 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
60 See notes 61-63 and accompanying text infra. Habeas for military personnel has become
more like the habeas available for state court convictions. Military personnel are required to
exhaust military remedies and review before going into federal court. See Schlesinger v. Coun-
cilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975); Sherman, Judicial Review of Military Determinations and the
Exhaustion of Remedies Requirement, 55 Va. L. Rev. 483 (1969). Habeas petitions are still of
no help to service personnel complaining of punitive discharge, reduction in rank, forfeiture of
pay, or nonjudicial punishment. See J. Bishop, supra note 35, at 130. However, the Military
Justice Act of 1983, U.C.M.J. art. 67, 10 U.S.C.A. § 867 (West 1983 & Supp. 1987), increased
the possibility for Supreme Court review of cases coming from the Court of Military Appeals
by instituting a procedure for writ of certiorari. See J. Jacobs, supra note 40, at 24.
61 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
62 The decision in Burns has four separate opinions and is cryptic, but has subsequently
been characterized by Chief Justice Warren as holding that
court martial proceedings could be challenged through habeas corpus actions brought in
civil courts, if those proceedings had denied the defendant fundamental rights. The vari-
ous opinions of the members of the Court... constitute recognition of the proposition
that our citizens in uniform may not be stripped of basic rights simply because they have
doffed their civilian clothes.
Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 181, 188 (1962).
63 Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974).
64 See, e.g., Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354 (1980). The government offers this expla-
nation generally, but this Note is concerned only with first amendment rights, so the discussion
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there is no doubt that the special characteristics of the military must be
considered in adjudicating these cases. However, as the law currently
stands, the mere invocation of military necessity is sufficient to trump a
serviceperson's claims that his or her first amendment rights have been
violated by the military. 65 A review of the development of first amend-
ment law for the military shows that what began as a weak but substan-
tive review has degenerated into virtually no review at all.
A. Parker v. Levy: Defining First Amendment Rights
Whereas Burns seemed to signal increased protection of individual
rights for military personnel, that liberalization has not been extended to
first amendment guarantees. Parker v. Levy 6 6 was the first case to
squarely present the issue of first amendment rights of military personnel
before the Supreme Court.67 The facts of the case were particularly ex-
plosive because Levy, a doctor whose job was to train medical person-
nel, 68 was an officer actively dissenting against a war to which his
students were likely to be sent. 69 The difficult factual setting may explain
its restrictive holding. Nevertheless, because it was the first case to dis-
cuss service personnel's first amendment rights, it continues to be a cen-
tral case in this field.70
Although Captain Levy performed most of his work, he refused to
train special-forces personnel.7x He also expressed his views on the Viet-
nam war to his students.72 The army court-martialed him for "conduct
will be limited to those issues specifically.
65 The most extreme example of this is Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), in
which the military claimed that compliance with every detail of the uniform regulations was
necessary, but did not offer any connection between the practice and the purposes of unifor-
mity or any other military goal. See id. at 514-15 (Brennan, J., dissenting); cf. Middendorf v.
Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 45-46 (1976) (upholding congressional determination to abrogate right to
counsel in summary court-martial proceedings to save military time and paperwork).
66 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
67 Id. at 768 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
68 Id. at 736.
69 Id. at 736-37.
70 Parker is cited in virtually every military case cited in this Note.
71 Parker, 417 U.S. at 736-77. Levy was tried under U.C.M.J. articles 133 and 134 not for
refusing to fully perform his work but for his speech. Id. at 769 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
72 The United States is wrong in being involved in the Viet Nam War. I would refuse to go
to Viet Nam if ordered to do so. I don't see why any colored soldier would go to Viet
Nam; they should refuse to go to Viet Nam and if sent should refuse to fight because
they are discriminated against and denied their freedom in the United States, and they
are sacrificed and discriminated against in Viet Nam by being given all the hazardous
duty and they are suffering the majority of casualties.... Special Forces personnel are
liars and thieves and killers of peasants and murderers of women and children.
Id. at 769-70 (quoting Dr. Levy). For an interesting account of events leading up to this case,
see Levy, Personal Testimony, in Conscience and Command 161 (J. Finn ed. 1971).
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unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, '73 and "disorder and neglects to
the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces." 74
In its opinion, the Court reviewed the long history of court-martial
for these offenses, and decided that Levy had violated the U.C.M.J. 75 It
also held that Levy's conduct "was unprotected under the most expan-
sive notions of the First Amendment."'76 The Court then disallowed
Levy's claims that the statutes were unconstitutional on their faces.
On the claims presented, Parker established a standard for review of
military statutes by the civilian courts. In Parker, the appellee argued
that two articles of the U.C.M.J. 77 were "void for vagueness" under the
due process clause and overbroad in violation of the first amendment.78
The Court did not apply conventional first amendment vagueness and
overbreadth analysis to the case,79 and instead established a standard
very deferential to the decisions of Congress in facially reviewing articles
of the U.C.M.J. The Court held that the proper standard for review of
vagueness claims against articles of the U.C.M.J. is the standard used in
73 U.C.M.J. art. 133, 10 U.S.C. § 933 (1982).
74 Id. art. 134, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1982).
75 "[A]ppellee could have had no reasonable doubt that his public statements urging Negro
enlisted men not to go to Vietnam if ordered to do so" violated articles 133 and 134. Parker,
417 U.S. at 757.
76 Id. at 761. Had the Court applied conventional first amendment law, it may have found
that Levy's speech was covered by the first amendment, but that the military's interest in
fighting the war in Vietnam provided a compelling state interest. Justice Douglas was of the
clear opinion that Levy's speech was within the ambit of the first amendment.
Making a speech or comment on one of the most important and controversial public
issues of the past two decades cannot by any stretch of dictionary meaning be included
in "disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed
forces".... [Dr. Levy] was uttering his own belief-an article of faith that he sincerely
held. This was no mere ploy to perform a "subversive" act. Many others who loved
their country shared his views .... Uttering one's beliefs is sacrosanct under the First
Amendment. Punishing the utterances is an "abridgment" of speech in the constitu-
tional sense.
Id. at 772 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
77 U.C.M.J. arts. 133-134, 10 U.S.C. §§ 933-934 (1982).
78 417 U.S. at 752.
79 Conventional first amendment overbreadth analysis requires that statutes restricting first
amendment activity be narrowly and specifically drafted so as to avoid chilling constitutionally
protected activity, see Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960), and even people who clearly
violated the statute may challenge its validity, see Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500
(1964). Vagueness challenges have elements of due process, even in the first amendment con-
text, and a statute is void for vagueness if there are no clear guidelines for law enforcement
officials or triers of fact, see Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974).
Instead of allowing Levy to present the claims of other potential speakers as is often done
in adjudication of overbreadth and vagueness challenges, see Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589 (1967), the Parker Court claimed to follow Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601
(1973), and disallowed a challenge that the statute may be unconstitutional as applied to some-
one other than the defendant. Parker, 417 U.S. at 759.
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reviewing criminal statutes that regulate economic behavior.80 In eco-
nomic affairs, the standard is that a defendant cannot be held liable if he
could not have reasonably known that the conduct in question was
prohibited.81
This standard is sufficiently clear for adjudication of vagueness chal-
lenges to the U.C.M.J.-if a defendant could have reasonably known that
his action would be prohibited under an article of the U.C.M.J., then he
can be held liable for it. This standard directs an individual to adjudica-
tions of economic regulation, and therefore provides a would-be law-
breaker with some guidance. Although the Court places a heavy burden
upon the claimant, the burden can be justified because the U.C.M.J. is a
statute drafted by Congress, and the Parker Court showed respect to a
co-equal branch by requiring a clear showing of unconstitutionality
before overturning a congressional decision.
Regarding Levy's overbreadth challenge, the Court cited United
States Civil Service Commission v. National Association of Letter Carri-
ers 82 and Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 3 adopting those cases' requirements of
substantial overbreadth, and going beyond those cases to additionally
constrict third-party standing because of the military context. 84
Whereas the standard that the Supreme Court developed in Parker
may be criticized as too restrictive of service personnel's first amendment
rights, it is, at least, an enunciated standard that can be followed in other
vagueness and overbreadth challenges to articles of the U.C.M.J. How-
ever, Parker's vagueness and overbreadth standards are simply of no use
in determining the constitutionality of other laws and regulations, such
as prior restraints on the expression of military personnel, 85 bans on
political speeches by civilians at a military base,86 or whether religious
exceptions should be made to military regulations. 87 However, Parker-
because it was the first Supreme Court case to discuss the issue of first
amendment rights of military personnel-has been considered the para-
digmatic case for all first amendment claims in the military context, even
where the standard enunciated in that case is inapplicable.
8o Parker, 417 U.S. at 756.
81 See United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971); see
also Parker, 417 U.S. at 757.
82 413 U.S. 548, 580-81 (1973), cited in Parker, 417 U.S. at 760.
83 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973), cited in Parker, 417 U.S. at 759-60.
84 Parker, 417 U.S. at 760.
85 See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980).
86 See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976); see also United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S.
675 (1985) (concerning selective deprivation of right to speak at open event on military base);
Persons for Free Speech v. United States Air Force, 675 F.2d 1010 (8th Cir.) (same), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1092 (1982).
87 Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
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B. Parker's Progeny
Parker has been repeatedly cited for the proposition that the mili-
tary may constrict rights88 -even where the Parker test is completely
inappropriate because the issue was not vagueness or overbreadth. Two
years after Parker, in Greer v. Spock,8 9 the Supreme Court decided a fa-
cial challenge to military regulations that required prior approval of all
political speeches and political literature before distribution on a military
base.90 The military commander was empowered to prevent the distribu-
tion of political literature if the commander was acting to avert what he
perceived to be a "clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of
troops on the base." 91 Although civilians brought this case on the ground
that it was a prior restraint on their right of free speech,92 they made a
facial attack on a military regulation that applied to service personnel
and civilians alike. The Court upheld the regulation, 93 noting that the
policy of keeping the military politically neutral had a long and constitu-
tional history.94
In Greer, the Court went even further than it had in Parker, because
the challenge was to a regulation, review of which should require less
88 See, e.g., Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 299 (1983); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348,
354 (1980); Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 50 (1976). The issue was identical to Parker in
Secretary of the Navy v. Avrech, 418 U.S. 677 (1974). The Court did not reopen the constitu-
tional debate in that case, but instead cited Parker and upheld the constitutionality of the
statute. See id. at 678.
89 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
90 Id. at 831 (citing Fort Dix Reg. 210-26 (1968); Fort Dix Reg. 210-27 (1970)).
91 Greer, 424 U.S. at 840.
92 Id. at 833-34.
93 The Court could have upheld the regulation as applied to civilians, rather than uphold-
ing it generally. Subsequent cases have reinforced the proposition that military bases are not
public forums and civilians have no right to get inside them to present their message. See
United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675 (1985); Persons for Free Speech v. United States Air
Force, 675 F.2d 1010 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1092 (1982).
Because Greer involved a challenge to a military regulation brought by civilians, the
Court could have applied conventional standards for public forums. A military base is not
generally an open area for the public, and as such it cannot be compared with the most pro-
tected public forums-streets and parks. See, e.g., Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). A
military base is property owned by the government, but it has been well established that not all
governmental property can be considered a public forum. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n. v.
Perry Local Educators Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37 (1983) (teachers' mailboxes in a public school are
not public forums); Cox v. Louisiana 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (courtroom is not public forum).
Furthermore, conventional first amendment analysis would hold that Dr. Spock had many
available forums and many willing listeners to his message. Although the Court is concerned
that a speaker have some adequate forum for his message, see, e.g., Heffron v. International
Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981), denying him access to military bases
did not silence his message. Even military personnel had access to Spock's message off of the
base or through other media. Greer, 424 U.S. at 849 (Powell, J., concurring).
94 Greer, 424 U.S. at 839.
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institutional respect than a congressional statute.95 The Court's scrutiny
of the regulation in Greer was also less exacting than of the statute in
Parker, because while the Parker Court enunciated a test-weak though
it was-and evaluated the statute against it,96 the Greer Court did not
even enunciate a standard by which to judge the regulation. It merely
trusted the commander's decision about what presents a threat to his
troops.
97
When facts similar to Greer, with military personnel as plaintiffs,
reached the Supreme Court in Brown v. Glines,9s the Court treated Greer
as authoritative, and recognized no difference between civilian and mili-
tary personnel challenging the prior restraint.99 Unlike the plaintiffs in
Greer v. Spock, a serviceperson lives on a base, and the people there are
his local community. Silencing military personnel on military bases vir-
tually silences them altogether. Furthermore, the military justice system
makes military personnel subject to a greater array of criminal sanctions
for speech 1°° than civilians.
In Brown, military personnel wanted to collect signatures for peti-
tions to be sent to members of Congress and the Secretary of Defense,
but did not obtain the prior approval required by regulation from their
commanders.10 1 The Supreme Court upheld the regulation by relying
upon Greer102 and reiterating approval of a commander's discretion to
"prevent the circulation of material that he determines to be a clear
threat to the readiness of his troops."10 3 The Court noted that the regula-
tion was the least restrictive means for achieving a governmental inter-
est, 1°4 even though the commander's judgment was the only criterion
and the Court offered no explanation of the "substantial governmental
95 While Congress is the judiciary's co-equal branch, the Department of Defense is not.
96 See text accompanying notes 77-84 supra.
97 The Court admitted, "It is possible, of course, that Reg. 210-27 might in the future be
applied irrationally, invidiously, or arbitrarily." Greer, 424 U.S. at 840.
98 444 U.S. 348 (1980).
99 See id. at 356 n.13 ("Glines would distinguish [Greer] on the ground that the plaintiffs in
that case were civilians who had no specific right to enter a military base. The distinction is
unpersuasive.").
IO There are several articles in the U.C.M.J. directed at speech. See U.C.M.J. art. 88, 10
U.S.C. § 888 (1982) (contempt toward officials); U.C.M.J. art. 89, 10 U.S.C. § 889 (1982) (dis-
respect toward superior officer); U.C.M.J. art. 91, 10 U.S.C. § 891 (1982) (insubordinate con-
duct including disrespectful language). Other articles may incidentally affect speech. See
U.C.M.J. arts. 82, 101, 104, 107, 117, 133-34, 10 U.S.C. §§ 882, 901, 904, 907, 917, 933-934
(1982).
IO Brown, 444 U.S. at 351.
102 Id. at 353. The Court should not have relied upon Greer because, although the Greer
Court sustained the regulation on its face, the Greer analysis centered on public forum doc-
trine from the perspective of an outsider requesting access. See Greer, 424 U.S. at 834-38.
103 Brown, 444 U.S. at 353; see also Greer, 424 U.S. at 837-39.
104 Brown, 444 U.S. at 355.
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interest." 105
This deference to the judgment of the commander went further than
the Parker Court had gone because the Brown Court accepted the com-
mander's determination of whether an application of the regulation
would be constitutional, rather than the Court itself determining
whether, in any particular case, the application had in fact been constitu-
tional. The regulation's built-in caveat that "advises commanders to pre-
serve servicemen's 'right of expression . . . to the maximum extent
possible' "106 was enough to convince the Court that the regulation was
sufficiently narrow.10 7
The Brown Court could not apply the standard announced in Parker
for the simple reason that a vagueness standard would be inappropriate
in deciding whether a regulation is an unconstitutional prior restraint. It
relied upon Parker, however, for the proposition that the military must
be allowed broad discretion over service personnel.' 08
According to conventional first amendment doctrine, Brown is
clearly more restrictive of first amendment rights than is Parker. If the
facts of the two cases were to be analyzed under the rigorous "clear and
present danger" standard that is the controlling law in the civilian com-
munity,109 then Levy's speech in Parker may have been restricted on the
grounds that he was directing his inferiors to imminently disobey lawful
orders to go to Vietnam.' 10 However, there was no possible expectation
of imminent lawless action in Brown, where all that Glines wanted to do
was petition his elected representatives about Air Force grooming re-
quirements.IIl To the contrary, his actions were entirely within the clas-
sic methods of bringing about change in a representative democracy.
Brown illustrates the Court's further divergence from civilian first
amendment tests, and shows a weaker level of scrutiny than the Court
gave the military in Parker. On their faces, the regulations at issue in
both Greer and Brown are of the most unconstitutional sort in the civilian
realm. Prior restraints are the most extreme cases of abridgment of the
first amendment right to free speech.1 12 The Brown Court took the deci-
105 Id.
106 Id. (quoting Department of Defense Directive 1325.6 (1969)).
107 See id.
108 See id. at 357.
109 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (state may not restrict speech unless
speech "is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action").
110 See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 736-37 (1973).
111 See Brown, 444 U.S. at 351.
112 The Court will uphold prior restraints only for the most compelling governmental inter-
ests. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 558-59 (1976); New York Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 715-16
(1931).
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sion in Parker further, freeing the military from the rigorous standards
that are ordinarily required to restrict first amendment rights. The Court
had only one more step to take after Brown-to accept explicitly the con-
stitutional judgment of the military and announce that it would not give
any substantive review to decisions made by the military that service per-
sonnel claim infringe their first amendment rights.
C. Goldman v. Weinberger: The Abyss
The trend away from protecting the first amendment rights of ser-
vice personnel reached its extreme expression in Goldman v. Wein-
berger,113 the most recent Supreme Court decision to review the military
establishment's power to abridge first amendment rights.114 Goldman
was a military psychologist who worked in a hospital on an Air Force
base.115 He was also a religious Jew who covered his head at all times116
in compliance with Jewish law, and in contradiction of an Air Force reg-
ulation. The regulation stated that "[h]eadgear will not be worn . . .
[w]hile indoors except by armed security police."11 7
Goldman encountered no problems'1 8 while wearing his yarmulke
until he testified at a court-martial in 1981, at which time opposing coun-
sel filed a complaint with Goldman's hospital commander. 119 Thereaf-
ter, his commander ordered him not to violate the regulation outside the
hospital.1 20 After Goldman protested to the Air Force General Counsel,
his commander prohibited him from wearing his yarmulke even in the
hospital, and he was refused permission to report for duty in civilian
clothes. 21 He was also "warned that failure to obey AFR 35-10 could
subject him to a court-martial." 122
A sharply divided Supreme Court upheld the Air Force regulation
on its face and as applied to Goldman, without giving actual considera-
113 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
114 See text accompanying notes 1-7 supra. A more recent decision, United States v. Stan-
ley, 107 S. Ct. 3054 (1987), in which a soldier who was, without his knowledge, used in an
LSD experiment was denied relief, illustrates the extent to which the Supreme Court will allow
the military to violate the integrity of the person. Recovery by military personnel for torts
committed by their superiors is governed by Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), and is
beyond the scope of this Note.
115 Goldman, 475 U.S. at 505.
116 Id. at 504; see note 2 supra.
117 Id. at 505 (quoting Air Force Reg. 35-10, q 1-6.h(2)(f)(1980)).
118 Goldman served as a chaplain in the Navy from 1970-1972 without incident, and had no
problem during his first three-and-a-half years in the Air Force. See Goldman v. Secretary of
Defense, 734 F.2d 1531 (D.C. Cir. 1984), aff'd, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
119 Goldman, 475 U.S. at 505.
120 Id.
121 Id. If he had been allowed to report in civilian clothes, then he would have been exempt
from the uniform requirements and permitted to wear his yarmulke.
122 Id.
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tion to Goldman's substantial constitutional claim. 123 The Court did not
proceed through a conventional first amendment analysis, which would
have looked at Goldman's claim and decided whether it was of constitu-
tional magnitude, and then decided whether the military's claim was
compelling enough to outweigh Goldman's claim.124 Instead, the Court
deferred to the "professional judgment of the Air Force," and never sub-
stantively reviewed the military's interest in uniformity. The Court
wrote:
[W]hether or not expert witnesses may feel that religious exceptions to
AFR 35-10 are desirable is quite beside the point. The desirability of
dress regulations in the military is decided by the appropriate military
officials, and they are under no constitutional mandate to abandon
their considered professional judgment. 125
Without declaring it explicitly, the Court implied that any decision of the
military, as long as the military authorities labeled it necessary for some
military need, would be immune from judicial scrutiny. 126
A concurrence by Justice Stevens approved of the regulation be-
cause it was "based on a neutral completely objective standard-visibil-
ity.' ' 127 The Air Force did not promulgate the regulation for the purpose
of discriminating against any religious group; it chose an arbitrary crite-
rion that seemed as good as any other. The significance of a uniform
regulation is that everybody dresses the same way; it does not matter the
specific dress that is chosen. 128
The problem with Justice Stevens's analysis is that facial neutrality
can be misleading. If the neutral dress requirement had included hats,
Goldman would have had no trouble complying with the regulation. 129
As Justice Brennan pointed out: "The practical effect of [Justice Ste-
vens's] categorization is that, under the guise of neutrality and even-
handedness, majority religions are favored over distinctive minority
123 See id. at 515-16 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
124 See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
125 Goldman, 475 U.S. at 509.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 513 (Stevens, J., concurring).
128 Id. at 512.
129 For the government to allow all people the free exercise of religion, the assumption that
Christianity is neutrally American must be recognized and rejected. Although Goldman
presents a subtle example, the principle here is no different than in mandatory Sunday rest
cases. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 1046 (1987) (Seventh-Day
Adventist constitutionally entitled to exemption from availability for work on Saturday to
qualify for unemployment benefits); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (same). In these
cases, it was clear that the particular day of rest was chosen by the state-deliberately or not-
because it was the day observed by most Americans. The "neutral" dress is consistent with
Christianity, and anyone who does not dress like a Christian dresses non-neutrally. The bias is
built into the analysis.
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faiths.... Under the Constitution there is only one relevant category-
all faiths."' 30
Justice Brennan's dissent argues that the Goldman Court shirked its
responsibility by refusing to review substantively a case in which the mili-
tary interfered with service personnel's constitutional rights.131 He
would require the military to prove, in a case like Goldman, that the
challenged regulation is "a narrowly tailored means of promoting impor-
tant military interests." 132 Justice Brennan argued that the military had
not even offered a rational basis in this case.1 33
Justice Blackmun argued in his dissent that the Air Force would
have been justified in refusing Goldman's exception to the regulation if it
had shown that it had "reason to fear that a significant number of en-
listed personnel and officers would request religious exemptions that
could not be denied on neutral grounds such as safety, let alone that
granting these requests would impair the overall image of the service."' 134
Although Justice Blackmun noted that decisions of the military generally
deserve respect, in this case, the military failed to present the evidence
necessary to override a constitutional fight, and therefore its decision did
not merit enforcement. 135
Justice O'Connor's dissent is the most interesting because it is the
only one that attempts to establish a standard for courts reviewing mili-
tary decisions that implicate the free exercise of religion rights of service
personnel. By drawing on existing precedent in free exercise adjudica-
tion, she concluded that the government must demonstrate an "unusu-
ally important interest" to deny a free exercise claim, and in addition,
"the government must show that . the means adopted is the 'least
restrictive' or 'essential,' or that the interest will not 'otherwise be
served.' ",136 The test used in free exercise claims outside of the military
context, she argued, "is sufficiently flexible to take into account the spe-
cial importance of defending our Nation without abandoning completely
the freedoms that make it worth defending." 137 Had the Court adopted
Justice O'Connor's view, there would be a standard of adjudication for
free exercise claims against the military, and for claims of unconstitu-
130 Goldman, 475 U.S. at 521 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
131 Id. at 515 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
132 Id. at 521 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
133 Id. at 516 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
134 Id. at 527 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
135 Id. at 527-28 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
136 Id. at 530 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor cited the following cases as ex-
isting precedent: United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S.
707 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
Goldman, 475 U.S. at 529.
137 Goldman, 475 U.S. at 530-31 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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tional applications of military regulations to speech. 38 This standard
would help develop a body of law in the military sphere, along with the
vagueness and overbreadth standards already articulated in Parker v.
Levy. 1 3
9
The implications of the majority's holding are sad and serious. 14°
There is little, after Goldman, left to Chief Justice Warren's assertion
that "citizens in uniform may not be stripped of basic rights simply be-
cause they have doffed their civilian clothes." 141 One consequence of this
decision is that the military can effectively limit its ranks to only a few
segments of society, making it even less representative of the American
people than it is now, 142 and needlessly prevent dedicated and able peo-
ple from serving their country unless they compromise their religious
convictions. Furthermore, if the draft is reinstated, 143 it is unclear
whether draftees in Goldman's position will be forced to contravene their
faith, or will be granted an exemption from service similar to the one
granted to conscientious objectors. 44 Either solution is an unfortunate
answer to a problem that could easily have been avoided by more judi-
cious foresight.
The automatic acceptance of the military's claim of necessity in
Goldman precluded the Court from evaluating the actual weight of the
claim that the military presented. Goldman established the precedent
that when the military states the necessity of a certain practice, the
courts end their inquiry without determining whether the practice is ac-
tually necessary-or even if it has any connection at all to the goal to be
achieved. If the federal courts defer to the constitutional judgment of the
138 The same balancing test is used to determine free exercise claims and free speech claims.
Once a constitutional right is established, the state must show a compelling government inter-
est to override that right. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (free exercise); Bran-
denburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (free speech).
139 See notes 77-84 and accompanying text supra.
140 Luckily, Congress may prevent the otherwise likely consequences of Goldman. The Sen-
ate has approved a proposal that would allow religious apparel to be worn by military person-
nel. See Vote Eases Stand on Religious Wear, N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1987, at A7.
141 Warren, supra note 62, at 188.
142 In his dissent in Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 770 (1974), Justice Douglas disparagingly
wrote, "The military, of course, tends to produce homogenized individuals who think-as well
as march-in unison."
143 Liberal supporters of the reinstatement of the draft think that it is necessary for the
unity of the American people to require individuals from every economic and social class to
serve their country. See, e.g., Lamar, Enlisting with Uncle Sam, Time, Feb. 23, 1987, at 30.
There is a great injustice in placing the entire responsibility for this nation's security on the
poor and minorities. A bill pending in Congress, H.R. 2225, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987),
introduced by Rep. Robert Torricelli (Dem., N.J.), would require all youths to perform one
year of civil or military service. See Lamar, supra. Recent commentary has suggested that it
will be necessary to reinstate the draft in order to guarantee a viable fighting force. Davis,
Bring Back the Draft, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1987, at A27.
144 See 50 U.S.C. app. § 4560) (1982).
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military, 145 there is nothing left for the civilian courts to do. As Justice
Brennan wrote: "[The] Court abdicates its responsibility to safeguard
free expression when it reflexively bows before the shibboleth of military
necessity." 146
What began in Parker as a weak but substantive review of the issues
and a decision about the weight to be given to Congress's judgment in a
facial challenge to legislation has degenerated into deference without
analysis 14 7 and complete acceptance of military judgment. For, as
Goldman shows, there no longer exists any substantive review of consti-
tutional challenges to the military in the federal courts. 148
The government should present factual proof of military necessity in
cases where it contends that such necessity overrides the constitutional
right of the individual. 149 The government is required to do exactly this
in the context of other constitutional claims.150 There is no principle to
explain why the courts are less able to evaluate the relationship between
a military regulation and its purported aim, than the relationship be-
tween a securities regulation and its purported aim.151 A substantive re-
view of the merits does not mean that the courts must become military
experts any more than it means they must be scientific experts to decide
patent cases. In satisfying its burden of proof, the government should
always be responsible for presenting evidence to the court.' 52
145 See Goldman, 475 U.S. at 509. Before Goldman, the Supreme Court was explicit about
deferring to the constitutional judgment of Congress. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420
U.S. 738, 753 (1975). But see Carlson v. Schlesinger, 511 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (circuit
court deferring to constitutional judgment of military authorities).
146 Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 370 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
147 See, e.g., Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300 (1983) (merely listing quotations from
earlier opinions about deference to military).
148 Justice O'Connor wrote in her dissent in Goldman:
The Court rejects Captain Goldman's claim without even the slightest attempt to weigh
his asserted right to the free exercise of his religion against the interest of the Air Force
in uniformity of dress .... No test for Free Exercise claims in the military context is
even articulated, much less applied.
475 U.S. at 528.
149 This is the reason why Justice Blackmun dissented in Goldman. See id. at 527; notes
134-35 and accompanying text supra.
150 See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149-52 (1983) (government firing); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 147-50 (1973) (laws restricting abortion); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444 (1969) (laws restricting speech).
151 See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
152 It is not the job of the courts to redefine military necessity in accordance with the reality
of today's armed forces. It is the military establishment, along with Congress, that should
undertake this reevaluation because they are responsible for legislation concerning the mili-
tary. Unfortunately, because Congress has not drawn new standards for the courts since the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, the legislation that exists today does not reflect the charac-
ter of today's armed forces. For example, today's armed forces are comprised mostly of tech-
nicians-less than 10% of total personnel are trained for combat. Sherman, supra note 39, at
45. Furthermore, today's armed forces are volunteer, making it a military necessity to attract
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The development of first amendment law for the military shows how
the civil courts' standard of review has degenerated into blind acceptance
of the military's position. The unfortunate, but understandable,
coincidence of a war and the beginning of judicial definition of the first
amendment rights of service personnel 153 may have resulted in a more
restrictive body of law than peacetime would have produced. The subse-
quent over-application by the Court of the first case to discuss the right
has resulted in further constriction and the present failure of the Court to
recognize any real first amendment rights for service personnel.
III
A Two-TIERED STANDARD AND ITS APPLICATION
As a review of the major cases concerning the first amendment
rights of military personnel shows, there is no clear standard by which
these cases are adjudicated, and there is little protection for the first
amendment rights of service personnel. A standard provides a test and a
principled ground upon which courts can make decisions, and thereby
establishes the fairness of the judicial system. While the military has spe-
cial needs and functions that require special consideration, the general
body of first amendment law should be a model for issues that arise in the
military context. Because the lower courts have no clear directive from
the Supreme Court on what the proper standard of substantive review
should be in any particular case, 154 reference to other areas of first
amendment precedent would provide lower courts with a source of law.
This Note proposes that the federal courts adopt a two-tiered ap-
proach to reviewing decisions from the military that implicate first
amendment rights of service personnel. When the country is at war, na-
tional security interests are so compelling that service personnel involved
in, and decisions made about, combat should be outside the reach of the
federal courts. In wartime, the foreign policy prerogative of the execu-
tive and the appropriations and declaration interests of Congress dimin-
committed young people to the armed forces; the shrinking population of young people exacer-
bates this problem. See Davis, supra note 143. The military is slowly changing its disciplinary
patterns to reduce coercion and increase manipulative and civilian-like controls. See L.
Radine, The Taming of the Troops: Social Control in the United States Army x (1977). If
Congress passed new legislation in light of the changing necessities, it would be a much easier
task to prove a connection between the legislation and the necessity that can be proved by
empirical military evidence. Part of the problem confronting the courts in their attempts to
evaluate military necessity is that Congress and the Department of Defense have never ad-
vanced the reasoning behind the regulations now in force.
153 See notes 68-72 and accompanying text supra.
154 Indeed Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), may send a message to the lower
courts that no substantive review is appropriate and that the courts should rubber stamp any
decision made by Congress, the Department of Defense, or military commanders.
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ish the relative institutional importance of the judiciary. In the small
class of cases concerning wartime combat decisions, the federal courts
should refuse to exercise jurisdiction, following the mandate explicated
in the Supreme Court's decision in Baker v. Carr.15 These cases present
nonjusticiable political questions 156 because they involve important for-
eign policy decisions, which the judiciary is particularly unqualified to
make, 157 and which have been entrusted to the other branches of
government. 5 8
In peacetime, however, the military interacts with the rest of Ameri-
can society more than it does with foreign nations, and therefore is not
primarily an instrument of foreign policy. Service personnel should be
treated similarly to other people performing governmental functions; the
military should be required to present compelling justification for abridg-
ing the first amendment rights of personnel in a peacetime force. 159 The
institutional interests that restrain the courts from substantively review-
ing military decisions are weak in peacetime, and therefore the individual
interests of the serviceperson must be addressed by the courts.1 60
Since periods of war are infrequent compared with periods of peace,
the compromise of service personnel's rights during emergencies is not a
large price for national security. On the other hand, the deferential re-
view that is presently being applied to cases concerning the military sub-
stantially compromises the liberty of service personnel, and therefore
violates the first amendment tenet requiring the narrowest possible regu-
lation of constitutionally protected activity.1 61 Substantive review in sit-
uations outside of wartime combat would accord with the policy of
restricting rights only to the extent absolutely essential because the great
majority of cases would be justiciable. In addition, the courts would not
have to create a test so vague as to respond to every possible military
circumstance. If one standard were to be established for both peace and
war situations, it would have to be so elastic that it would be useless.
155 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
156 See Henkin, supra note 24, at 599. The political question doctrine, unlike a very defer-
ential standard of review, prevents the courts from placing a constitutional stamp of approval
on a legislative or executive action. The judgment is in the hands of a coordinate branch.
157 See, e.g., Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948) (Court
will not review executive order concerning involvement of U.S. citizens in foreign air transpor-
tation); Commercial Trust Co. v. Miller, 262 U.S. 51, 57 (1923) (legislature determines dates of
hostilities).
158 See, e.g., Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) (executive and legisla-
ture control foreign affairs); notes 162-68 and accompanying text infra.
159 See notes 190-95, 227-41 and accompanying text infra.
160 See notes 181-89 and accompanying text infra.
161 See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) ("[E]ven though the governmental
purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly
stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.").
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A. Claims Arising In Combat
In wartime, the problems of judicial review of military decisions are
most acute. The immediate needs of the military in the midst of hostili-
ties are hard to understand and even harder to judge in retrospect. 162
Military leaders must-at crucial moments in battle-use their judg-
ment. In addition, the price of judicial error during a war may be paid in
the lives of American soldiers. 163
The political question doctrine exists for situations where the sepa-
ration of powers calls for judicial restraint.164 Foreign policy decisions
are the quintessential political questions to which many commentators
refer, 165 and which courts have for years refused to adjudicate. 166 One
theory behind the political question doctrine is that foreign policy should
be in the hands of the government branches directly responsible to the
people for their actions. 167 Another argument favoring political question
status for foreign policy is the simple constitutional argument that the
power was expressly delegated to the executive and Congress and not the
judiciary. 68
In 1962, the Supreme Court defined the political question doctrine
in Baker v. Carr,169 and clearly established it as a justiciability doctrine.
Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan stated:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political ques-
tion is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of
the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossi-
bility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's un-
dertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the re-
spect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
162 See Hirschhorn, supra note 22, at 202-07, 240; see also Warren, supra note 62, at 187
("[C]ourts are ill-equipped to determine the impact .. that any particular intrusion upon
military authority might have. Many of the problems of the military society are... alien to
the problems with which the judiciary is trained to deal.").
163 See Hirschhorn, supra note 22, at 240; see also Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Polit-
ical Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 Yale L.J. 517, 567 (1966) (arguing that difficulty in
obtaining information justifies not deciding a case).
164 C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts § 14, at 75 (4th ed. 1970).
165 See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 24, at 610; Scharpf, supra note 163, at 541.
166 As early as 1839, the executive was entrusted with the exclusive power of determining
who was the sovereign of a foreign nation. Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415,
420 (1839); see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936)
(President has exclusive power in external relations).
167 See Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948).
168 See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319-20; U.S. Const. art. II, § 2; note 10 supra.
169 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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various departments on one question. 170
These criteria are not susceptible of mechanical application, and
courts deciding whether to abstain from review because of these factors
must weigh their importance against the interests in favor of review.
These factors show that the political question doctrine is a combination
of jurisdictional limits and prudential discretion, t7 1 because some factors
address the constitutional role of the courts in a tripartite system, while
some factors address the practical limitations of judicial review.
During wartime, the textual commitment to other branches is par-
ticularly strong-Congress is explicitly granted the power to declare war
and to support armies. 172 Consistent with the function of the representa-
tive body, Congress makes the policy decisions concerning a war, and
judicial review of aspects of a war would likely implicate review of these
broader decisions.
The President is Commander in Chief of the armed forces,17 3 and
while this role belongs to him in both peacetime and wartime, the relative
importance of the role to the President and the American people in war-
time strengthens the importance of the textual commitment and requires
more solicitude from the other branches. Thus, in wartime, there is a
particularly strong combination of "textually demonstrable constitu-
tional commitment[s] ... to coordinate political department[s]." 174
Because of the importance of these particular powers in wartime,
combined with the fact that the expression of these powers is making an
important international statement, the last three factors 175 in the Baker
test are more important during times of war than in times of peace. Dur-
ing war, there is an unusual need to have a unified national policy. Be-
cause the military functions of the executive and legislature take on
increased gravity and public attention, a judicial pronouncement con-
trary to the political branches in such a circumstance would likely show
disrespect and embarrass a coordinate branch. Further, there are not
judicially manageable standards for war. The political branches, because
they have superior fact-finding machinery and responsibility to the peo-
ple through the democratic process, are better able than the judiciary to
170 Id. at 217.
171 See Scharpf, supra note 163, at 538-49; Tigar, Judicial Power, the "Political Question
Doctrine" and Foreign Relations, 17 UCLA L. Rev. 1135, 1135 (1970).
172 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. The constitutionally required two-year appropriations limit re-
quires that Congress review the actions of the armed forces at least that often. The courts will
not review the constitutionality of a war. Cf. Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934 (1967) (Court
refused to review constitutionality of American involvement in Vietnam).
173 U.S. Const. art. II, § 2.
174 Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
175 These are: (1) respect due coordinate branches of government, (2) unusual need to ad-
here to political decision, and (3) embarrassment to other departments. Id.
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make determinations about war.176 Furthermore, war, waged against an-
other sovereign nation itself not subject to the constraints of the Consti-
tution, does not fit within the constitutional structure; therefore, the
Constitution can offer no guidance about how it should be conducted. 177
The Constitution describes who has power, but says nothing about the
manner in which that power should be exercised.
If a court refuses to adjudicate an issue because it is a political ques-
tion, the court is not condoning the action of the political branches but is
merely saying that it is not the judiciary's role to judge the constitutional-
ity of the action.178 This places a special constitutional responsibility on
the political branches to review their own decisions.179 In times of war
the representatives of the people can be trusted with representing the in-
terests of individuals serving their country because a wartime draft in-
volves enough people to make the democratic political system react. 180
B. Claims Arising During Peace
1. Balance of Interests
In times of peace, the emergency interests of a country at war are
absent, and the maintenance of the military is less of a foreign policy
matter, and more of an internal matter. The factors that the Court enun-
ciated in Baker 18 are simply not as pressing in peacetime as they are
during war.
The textual commitments' 82 remain the same during war and peace,
but their practical and political importance diminish in peacetime; this
reduces the possibility of embarrassing a coordinate branch of govern-
ment. 1 83 In peacetime, there is less need for a nonjudicial policy determi-
nation,' 84 and it is more appropriate to provide a constitutional
176 Hirschhorn, supra note 22, at 246.
177 Id. at 252.
178 See Scharpf, supra note 163, at 535.
179 See P. Brest, Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking 1-46 (1975).
180 The interests of the members of the military will be properly represented on the political
scene if there is a draft, because a military comprised of all elements of society is capable of
acting through the representative democracy without special solicitude from the an-
timajoritarian branch of the judiciary. See J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust 73-104 (1980) (ju-
dicial review allows purification of political process and activism by nonpolitical branch on
behalf of minorities who are powerless in that process). However, service personnel during
times of peace are powerless to pursue their interests. This is the assumption that partially
underlies the two-tiered scrutiny of equal protection jurisprudence. Suspect classes, which
cannot protect themselves with majoritarian politics, require judicial protection. See United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
181 See text accompanying note 170 supra.
182 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 189, 217 (1962).
183 See id.
184 See id.
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determination. 18 5  Judicial standards are more manageable 8 6 during
peace than during war because emergency military needs do not arise
during peacetime. Conventional first amendment standards can easily be
adapted to consider peacetime interests. Judicial mistakes are also less
dangerous in peacetime because lives will not be lost as a result of them,
and there is less need to adhere to political decisions already made187
because those decisions have not been invested with the lives of Ameri-
cans. When the political question interests are weak, the interest in hav-
ing the judiciary available to adjudicate cases and controversies 88 argues
for justiciability. 189
Standard first amendment law requires the state to justify restric-
tions on free expression and free exercise of religion by showing that the
state has an important interest that cannot be served without the restric-
tions.' 90 With the exception of the narrow class of constitutionally un-
protected speech such as obscenity, 9 1 speech cannot be curtailed unless
it presents a "clear and present danger" as that phrase is defined in Bran-
denburg v. Ohio.192 Any time that the state wants to abridge an individ-
ual's constitutional right, it must show a compelling state interest.193
The regulation must also be narrowly tailored to achieve the state's goal
without abridging more protected activity than is necessary,' 94 and any
regulation that the state proposes for speech that does not present a clear
and present danger must be content-neutral.1 95 Therefore, the proper
185 Constitutional determinations are part of the special function of the judiciary. See Mar-
bury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
186 See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
187 See id.
188 See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
189 In Baker itself, the Court held that the requirements of the political question doctrine
were not sufficiently fulfilled, and proceeded to adjudicate the issue, which was apportionment
of a state legislature. 369 U.S. at 208-37.
9O0 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (free exercise); Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444 (1969) (free speech).
191 See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
192 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
193 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (state's interest in protecting potential life
not great enough to outweigh woman's right to abortion until third trimester); Yoder, 406 U.S.
at 215 ("only those interests of the highest order.., not otherwise served" can outweigh free
exercise claim); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444 (1963) (state must demonstrate "sub-
stantive evils flowing from petitioner's activities, which can justify the broad prohibitions
which it has imposed").
194 Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (state may not discharge all employ-
ees who are members of communist organization but may differentiate based on nature of their
membership and sensitivity of their positions).
195 See Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (city cannot choose to allow picketing on
particular subject and not others). The state can regulate the time, place, and manner of
speech without constitutional infirmity, but may not regulate the content. See, e.g., Clark v.
Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (upholding regulation restricting
sleeping in public park, even though persons sleeping were protesting for homeless); Kovacs v.
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standard for adjudication of peacetime cases involving first amendment
claims of service personnel should be the established judicial standard for
first amendment claims of civilians.
2. Application of First Amendment Protection to Government
Employees as a Model for the Military
Even if military personnel cannot expect the robust protection that
the first amendment provides civilians, there must be a limit on the re-
strictions imposed on their rights. Groups other than military personnel
have special restrictions on their first amendment rights, but those re-
strictions are limited for certain purposes. Prisoners, for example, do not
enjoy the full expressive rights of the rest of the citizenry. 196 Broadcast-
ers can be limited in what they air on the radio.197 Children also have a
less robust first amendment right than adults, 198 particularly as regards
their right to receive information. 199
The law as applied to government employees and benefits recipients
is a particularly good model for how the law should be applied to mili-
tary personnel. Government employees have a more restricted first
amendment right than the rest of society,2°° and their position, relative to
the federal government, is analogous to service personnel.20 1 Govern-
ment employees carry out the will of the American people in the domes-
tic sphere, and military employees do the same in the international
sphere; both groups are the means to accomplish the collective national
end.20 2 Both must sometimes sacrifice personal goals for the good of the
country. 20 3 Both are part of a democratic process that does not always
function smoothly without safeguards to monitor the process.2°4 The
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (upholding ordinance that regulated, but did not prohibit, use of
loudspeakers).
196 See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (prisoners are entitled to first amendment
protection as long as their expression does not interfere with penological objectives); Jones v.
North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977) (prohibition of solicitation for prisoners'
union constitutional).
197 See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (government can regulate indecent
language on the radio).
198 See Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986) (school may sanction student
for making sexual allusions during speech at school assembly).
199 See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (state can control availability
of erotic material to youths).
200 See notes 210-26 and accompanying text infra.
201 See J. Jacobs, supra note 40, at 28 (implying civilian workplace is proper model for
volunteer armed forces).
202 See Hirschhorn, supra note 22, at 234 (on military employees).
203 Military employees sometimes sacrifice their lives. Civil employees sacrifice their polit-
ical activism. See, e.g., United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers,
413 U.S. 548 (1973).
204 See United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (limiting political activities of
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major difference between civil service and military employees is often
only the government entity that employs them because the content of
their work is often the same.20 Therefore, it is logical to treat their
claims the same way.
It has been argued that military personnel must be restricted in their
political speech to guarantee their military effectiveness. 20 6 However,
there is little merit in the argument that the rights of enlisted personnel
must be restrained to prevent military encroachment on political deci-
sions. The real danger to democracy comes from the powerful senior
military officials who actually are in a position to vie with the civil au-
thorities for power.20 7 The serviceperson being denied first amendment
rights is merely a cog in the military machine. Furthermore, persons
entering the armed forces have already been civilian citizens, and it is
naive to think the military can erase the political memories of an
enlistee. 208
The Court has established standards and reasons for restricting the
first amendment rights of government employees, and has done so in a
limited and principled way.209 These limits and principles should guide
the courts in developing a standard of review for military personnel alleg-
ing military infringement of their constitutional rights.
a. Permissible restrictions on government employees. The govern-
ment can place restrictions on the constitutional expression of its em-
ployees if it has a compelling reason to do so.2 10 For example, in United
Public Workers v. Mitchell,211 the Supreme Court upheld a statute re-
stricting political activity by classified federal employees. It balanced the
government employees to promote integrity and efficiency in civil service).
205 Only 10% of service personnel have jobs involving combat skills, while 54% have jobs
involving technical specialties. The rest perform service jobs. "In short, today's military is a
big business, with a substantial portion of its members being non-career civilian-soldiers who
serve their country in a service job or at a desk." Sherman, supra note 39, at 45.
206 See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 841 (1980) (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("Permitting
political campaigning on military bases cuts against a 200-year tradition of keeping the mili-
tary separate from political affairs, a tradition that in my view is a constitutional corollary to
the express provision for civilian control of the military in Art. II, § 2, of the Constitution.");
Dash v. Commanding Gen., 307 F. Supp. 849, 856 (D.S.C. 1969) ("[T]o organize meetings on
base, to seek to create of and within the military itself a cohesive force for the purpose of
compelling political decisions... would undermine civilian government, especially civil con-
trol of the military . ), aff'd, 429 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 981
(1971).
207 See L. Boudin, The Army and The First Amendment, in Conscience and Command 66
(J. Finn ed. 1971) (noting that Truman-MacArthur clash "illustrates the potential danger" of
independent judgment of military officials).
203 See Finn, supra note 22, at 14-16.
209 See notes 210-26 and accompanying text infra.
210 This is the standard test in first amendment adjudication. See note 25 supra.
211 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
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"requirements of orderly management of administrative personnel"212
against the right of free expression, and found that the balance weighed
in favor of the government because political partisanship among certain
employees could destroy the democratic process.213 In reviewing con-
gressionally imposed restrictions on the first amendment rights of federal
employees, the Court construed the statutes as constitutional on their
faces, and respected Congress's evaluation of the interests to be served.
However, the Court also inquired into the connection between the gov-
ernment's means and ends to decide if Congress was justified in passing
the legislation.214
The Court has not always found that the governmental interest jus-
tified contraction of government employees' first amendment rights. For
example, in Pickering v. Board of Education,21 5 the Court held that the
discharge of a public school teacher for writing a letter to a local newspa-
per criticizing the use of funds by the local school board violated his
constitutional right of free speech. The Court balanced the first amend-
ment rights of the teacher as citizen against the state's interest in promot-
ing the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees,216 and held that a teacher could not be dismissed for expres-
sing his views on important public issues.217
It would be entirely possible for the Court to apply the Pickering
balancing test in the military context. The Court could allow service
personnel to exercise their first amendment rights unless such exercise
undermined the services that the military is organized to perform218 or
the internal organization of the military.219 Like all balancing tests, this
test gives the courts broad discretion in weighing governmental and indi-
vidual interests, but any test that requires a compelling state interest
places a heavy burden on the government. 220
212 Id. at 94.
213 Id. at 96.
214 See id. at 101; United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers,
413 U.S. 548 (1973). In upholding the Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2), the Court wrote:
Although Congress is free to strike a different balance than it has, if it so chooses, we
think the balance it has so far struck is sustainable by the obviously important interests
sought to be served by the limitations on partisan political activities now contained in
the Hatch Act.
413 U.S. at 564.
215 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
216 Id. at 568.
217 Id. at 574; see also Mount Healthy School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (discuss-
ing burden of proof in challenging discharge on first amendment grounds).
218 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983). For example, the military's interest
would outweigh the individual's interest if a serviceperson divulged military secrets to a
newspaper.
219 See id.
220 It can be argued that military employment is a privilege that the government can deny to
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In the teacher dismissal cases, 221 a special government employee sit-
uation with which the courts have dealt, the Court stressed the
equivalent chilling effect that criminal sanctions and threats of removal
from employment would have on willing speakers. 222 However, when
criminal sanctions are actually involved, as is true for military personnel,
the penalties for exercising rights are even greater than in the teacher
dismissal cases, and therefore the courts should be more careful in al-
lowing criminal sanctions to be applied. In the military context, a ser-
viceperson is subject to the double penalty of court-martial and
involuntary discharge. 223
individuals. The increasingly contractual nature of the armed forces supports granting the
government discretion to bargain for any requirements it desires. See J. Jacobs, supra note 40,
at 13-17 (describing contractual character of modem volunteer armed forces). Under such a
theory, the serviceperson who volunteers for the armed forces waives whatever rights for
which he did not bargain. Not only is this argument inapplicable to the draft, it is also incon-
sistent with established precedent outside the military context. Whether something is consid-
ered a personal right or a government benefit, the Supreme Court has held that neither rights
nor privileges may be conditioned on waiver of constitutional rights. See, e.g., Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). The one exception to the consistent treatment of rights and
privileges has been implicit in the privilege of military employment. In a case upholding a
regulation barring single parents with dependent children from the Army, the court wrote, "It
is well established that there is no right to enlist in this country's armed services." Lindenau v.
Alexander, 663 F.2d 68, 72 (10th Cir. 1981).
However, in the civilian sphere, the Supreme Court has explicitly stated, "'[T]he theory
that public employment which may be denied altogether may be subject to any conditions,
regardless of how unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected.'" Keyishian v. Board of Re-
gents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967) (quoting case below, 345 F.2d 236, 239 (1965)). In Sher-
bert, the Court required South Carolina to offer unemployment benefits to people who could
not fully comply with the availability-for-work requirements for religious reasons-the state
had denied benefits to a Seventh Day Adventist who refused to work on Saturdays-allowing
limitations only if the religious actions pose a "substantial threat to public safety, peace, or
order." Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403. The Court held that "to condition the availability of
benefits upon this appellant's willingness to violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith
effectively penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional liberties." Id. at 406.
The Court could have applied the Sherbert analysis in Goldman and held that because the
uniform regulations required Goldman to "violate the tenets of his faith virtually every minute
of every work day," Goldman, 475 U.S. at 514 (Brennan, J. dissenting), as applied to him they
were unconstitutional burdens on free exercise. As the Court stated in Sherbert: "It is too late
in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial
of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege." Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404 (footnote
omitted). Whether or not military employment is a right or a privilege, it should certainly not
be conditioned upon repudiation of religious practice.
221 Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. 274, Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968), and
Keyishian, 385 U.S. 589, are all included in this category, as are many others. See, e.g.,
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Kingsville Indep. School Dist. v. Cooper, 611 F.2d
1109 (5th Cir. 1980); Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969).
222 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574.
223 In the armed forces, the kind of discharge a person gets determines pension benefits, and
a bad conduct discharge seriously hampers a person's efforts in finding a job in the civilian
realm. See Stapp v. Resor, 314 F. Supp. 475, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) ("There can be no doubt
that a military discharge on other than honorable grounds is punitive in nature, since it stigma-
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Although teacher dismissal cases can be distinguished from military
cases because the teacher cases involve federal court review of state law,
not federal court review of federal law, the teacher dismissal cases are
still a sound model for adjudication.22 4 Notwithstanding the federalism
issue, the theory of constitutional adjudication is the same in both
realms: the Constitution is a limit on what government may do. In Elrod
v. Burns,225 the Supreme Court explicitly adopted an ultra vires approach
to governmental power and stated: "[T]here can be no impairment of
executive power, whether on the state or federal level, where actions pur-
suant to that power are impermissible under the Constitution. Where
there is no power, there can be no impairment of power. '2 26
The guidelines that these government employee cases establish are
good general guidelines for protecting the first amendment rights of all
government employees, military or civil. The government should be al-
lowed to restrict first amendment rights if such restriction is necessary
for the functioning of government. That restriction, however, should be
as narrow as possible, and the Bill of Rights should be considered a limi-
tation on the government's power to control its servants.
b. Application to the military. Conventional first amendment law,
as applied to government employees, should guide the federal courts in
judging the first amendment rights of military personnel in peacetime.
The standard that Justice O'Connor suggested in her dissent in Goldman
v. Weinberger22 7 provides an excellent starting point. It is an explication
of classic free exercise law22 8 as applied to military personnel. Her stan-
tizes the serviceman's reputation, impedes his ability to gain employment and is in life, if not in
law, prima facie evidence against the serviceman's character, patriotism, or loyalty.").
224 Pursuant to the supremacy clause of the Constitution, the federal government is able to
require the states to enforce federal laws and policies. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the
Land... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstand-
ing." U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; see also Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1947) (describing
states' duties to enforce federal laws).
225 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
226 Id. at 352. The Elrod court held that government power is limited to what a govern-
ment may command directly. Id. at 359. Therefore, if the military forbids yarmulkes because
it cannot constitutionally forbid enlistment of orthodox Jews, the prohibition on yarmulkes
would be unconstitutional under Elrod. The Elrod Court also noted that the government's
justification for impairing constitutional rights "must survive exacting scrutiny .... The inter-
est advanced must be paramount, one of vital importance, and the burden is on the govern-
ment to show the existence of such an interest." Id. at 362. The Court explicitly stated that a
rational relation between purpose and means is insufficient. Id. at 362.
227 475 U.S. 503, 530-31 (1986); see text accompanying notes 136-39 supra.
228 Because the case before the Court concerned a free exercise claim, Justice O'Connor
used the language of free exercise jurisprudence in her analysis. Because the application of the
free exercise clause is essentially the same as that of the free speech clause, see note 26 supra,
Justice O'Connor's standard may be approriately applied to free speech analysis as well.
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dard would treat all Americans consistently, both in and out of uniform.
Under Justice O'Connor's standard,
when the government attempts to deny a Free Exercise claim, it must
[first] show that an unusually important interest is at stake, whether
the interest is denominated "compelling," "of the highest order," or
"overriding." Second, the government must show that granting the
requested exemption will do substantial harm to that interest, whether
by showing that the means adopted is the "least restrictive" or "essen-
tial," or that the interest will not "otherwise be served." 2
29
Any special needs of the military can be taken into account under
the "government interest" 230 prong of the test in the same way that
courts balance government interests in government employee first
amendment adjudication. 23' While it is certainly true that the military
serves a unique function in our government,232 so do the local sheriff,
233
the district attorney's office,23 4 the postal service,235 and the public
schools. 236 All these other organizations have been subject to balancing
test analysis when their members have raised first amendment claims;
only in military cases does the Court accept the government's claim at
face value.2 37
If the courts had used the Pickering balancing test that has been
used for government employees238 in cases involving military personnel,
many of the military decisions would have upheld the free speech and
free exercise rights of those in the service. For example, in Goldman,239
because the government offered no "explanation of how the contested
practice is likely to interfere with the proffered military interest, '240 the
regulation forbidding him from wearing a yarmulke while on duty would
not have passed muster under a Pickering balancing test.24'
229 Goldman, 475 U.S. at 530 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
230 The interests that some courts have taken into account to determine jurisdiction over a
claim from the military are more appropriately balanced under the government interest part of
the substantive test. See note 57 supra for relevant factors.
231 See notes 210-26 and accompanying text supra.
232 This is the argument proffered in support of the separate community doctrine, in the
face of which the Court has considered itself completely paralyzed. See, e.g., Rostker v.
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
233 See Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
234 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
235 See United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548
(1973).
236 See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
237 See notes 124-26, 145-48 and accompanying text supra.
238 See notes 215-17 and accompanying text supra.
239 Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986); see notes 113-44 and accompanying text
supra.
240 Id. at 516. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
241 The military did not present any evidence tending to show that the yarmulke exception
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Under the O'Connor test, guided by the Pickering government em-
ployee model, 242 the government may have prevailed in Parker v. Levy 24 3
because Dr. Levy was actively undermining the internal command struc-
ture244 by encouraging his inferiors to refuse to obey orders.2 45 However,
the Court would have recognized that a serious first amendment problem
existed because Dr. Levy was expressing his opinion on matters of the
utmost public interest, just as the teacher was doing in Pickering.2 46
Nonetheless, Justice O'Connor's first amendment analysis would require
a compelling showing by the government once Levy established that his
speech was covered by the first amendment.2 47 Justice O'Connor's stan-
dard requires the military to present evidence proving the importance of
the regulation that it wants upheld. "'Rules are rules' is not by itself a
sufficient justification .... -248
The second part of the O'Connor test-showing substantial harm or
least restrictive means-would place a heavier burden on commanders
making decisions than it would upon Congress in legislating.2 49 This is
because many military regulations grant the power to commanders to
make exceptions to the regulations,250 and many regulations give com-
manders great leeway in defining the meaning of the congressional stan-
dards.25 1 While a slightly over- or underinclusive congressional mandate
might be sufficiently narrow to pass muster under this prong of the test,
would harm the military. See Goldman v. Secretary of Defense, 29 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
32,753 (D.D.C. 1982) ("[D]eference can only be given to the decision maker regulating the
military when its decision was a reasoned and deliberate one."), vacated, 734 F.2d 1531 (D.C.
Cir. 1984), aff'd, Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
242 See notes 215-17 and accompanying text supra.
243 417 U.S. 733 (1974); see notes 66-87 and accompanying text supra.
244 In Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), the Court upheld a dismissal of a government
worker because the fired individual had undermined a positive working environment.
245 See notes 71-74 and accompanying text supra.
246 See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); notes 215-17 and accompanying
text supra.
247 Although the Parker Court held that Levy's speech was not protected by the first
amendment, had the Court applied first amendment standards for claims outside of the mili-
tary, the speech would most certainly have been protected. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733,
772 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Political speech is at the core of the first amendment
tradition. See, e.g., Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 107 S. Ct.
616 (1986); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); see also Bork, Neutral Principles and
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1, 20 (1971) (arguing that explicit political
speech deserves special first amendment status).
248 Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 525 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
249 Case law indicates that the Court is more often concerned about respecting Congress's
judgments than those of commanders. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981)
(congressional decision about registration requirements); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498
(1975) (congressional decision about mandatory discharge).
250 See, e.g., Goldman, 475 U.S. at 509 (citing Air Force Reg. 35-10 (1980)); note 45 and
accompanying text supra.
251 See note 47 and accompanying text supra.
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each commander exception or denial of an exception would have to be
legitimated by demonstration of substantial harm. Under this standard,
for example, the government would have had to show that granting the
requested exemption to Goldman would have undermined the purpose of
the uniform regulations, or interfered with the health and safety of
Goldman or other service personnel, or have been entirely impractical to
administer.
Furthermore, as regards the discretionary decisions of commanders,
there is less constitutional tension because the judiciary would not be
directly reviewing a decision made by another branch of government, but
would be reviewing the decision of someone two levels of power removed
from a co-equal branch. Unlike decisions of Congress, commander deci-
sions have not been reviewed by representatives of the electorate, and are
not subject to political pressure from the public.252 There are no political
checks on the decisions of commanders, as there are for decisions of Con-
gress, and therefore there is a special need for review by the judiciary.2 53
As applied, the standard proposed in this Note would accommodate
all of the Court's interests in the military area. It would allow the mili-
tary to pursue an effective and unfettered policy in wartime combat. It
would show Congress great respect in its power to legislate for the mili-
tary, assuming that Congress can support the decisions it makes with
factual evidence. And most important, it would greatly increase the first
amendment protections for military personnel, reinforcing the courts'
role as the guardians of constitutional rights for all Americans.
CONCLUSION
Military personnel suffer much greater abridgment of their first
amendment rights than other Americans, and the federal courts are par-
tially responsible because they accept the judgment of the military in-
252 In peacetime, the political process does not check congressional actions affecting the
military as well as it does in wartime. The soldiers in a small, peacetime, volunteer armed
force are an underrepresented group, and as such need more judicial solicitude than draftees
during a war. When the majority is not subject to the consequences of legislation, it would be
more likely for the legislature to strike an unjust balance-most voters and legislators would
gladly sacrifice someone else's liberty for their own security. Therefore, the serviceperson is
not properly protected in the political process during peace. Cf. J. Ely, supra note 180. Com-
manders are not scrutinized by the electorate every two or six years, like members of Congress.
253 Commander decisions are particularly suspicious because studies have shown that "[t]he
armed forces are not always rational; superiors frequently develop emotional attachment to
military practices that do not enhance efficiency but do alienate the men subject to them."
Hirschhorn, supra note 22, at 228. Military authorities have always resisted change that gives
servicepersons more autonomy, even though changes have made the armed forces more able
and efficient. Id. at 243. A few examples of these changes have been: (1) abolition of corporal
punishment; (2) racially integrated troops; (3) more legal rights in court-martial; and (4) less
formal, more manipulative control. Id.
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stead of substantively reviewing the merits of each party's claims.
Unqualified deference to the professional judgment of the military not
only undervalues the rights of service personnel, but also undermines the
adjudicative role of the federal courts. By allowing the military to decide
when its institutional interests outweigh the interests of the individual
serviceperson, the courts allow the military to usurp their role in the
American constitutional system.
Throughout history, the federal courts have developed a vast and
flexible body of first amendment law, and they have considered them-
selves fit to review first amendment claims of people in different situa-
tions. With proper evidence before a court, it is able to balance the
interests of the parties to achieve a just solution. If the courts begin to
draw on this body of law and how it has been applied to government
employees, then they will have a model against which to adjudicate first
amendment claims of military personnel.
In Goldman v. Weinberger, the Supreme Court reached its most def-
erential extreme, and now it should reevaluate that position and recog-
nize the necessity for some standard of review for first amendment claims
arising against the military in peacetime. While special concerns during
times of war may convince the federal courts that cases arising in combat
situations are nonjusticiable pursuant to the political question doctrine,
in times of peace, it is not only institutionally appropriate, but constitu-
tionally necessary for the courts to substantively review first amendment
claims of military personnel.
Linda Sugin
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